Colombia’s security forces will try to uphold bilateral ceasefires with five illegal armed groups in the coming six months.
The ceasefires would temporarily end hostilities between the security forces and guerrilla group ELN, the main FARC dissident groups, and paramilitary organizations AGC and Los Pachenca.
The ceasefires are extremely delicate and could fail for a number of reasons.
Perhaps most importantly, the government’s ceasefires with the illegal armed groups don’t imply a cessation of hostilities between the groups themselves.
This violence arguably affects the civilian population more than violence between the security forces and the illegal armed groups.
Another complication would be common law enforcement as all illegal armed groups rely on organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, illegal mining and extortion, to finance their organizations.
This means that there’s a considerable chance of ongoing violence in regions where the illegal armed groups have been vying for control over the illegal economy.
The government’s ceasefires could even fail if this rivalry ends up escalating violence in these troubled regions.
The chances of other illegal armed groups causing violence is a relatively minor concern because of the combined power of the five groups that agreed to cease fire with the government.
All risks aside, the ceasefires greatly increase the chances of significant and lasting progress in the peace talks with the ELN, and talks to dismantle the groups formed by dissidents of paramilitary organization AUC and guerrilla organization FARC.
The ceasefires also allow the government to move forward with development programs in regions that would allow the integrations of rural communities in the legal economy instead of the illegal economies that have repeatedly financed new cycles of violence for decades.
What will be important to keep in mind that — contrary to the government’s claim to seek “Total Peace” — a partial success of Petro’s peace policy could already cause a significant reduction of violence and allow the security forces to more efficiently use their resources to dismantle whatever group or groups that ultimately decide to remain in arms.
In short, there’s a lot that could go wrong in the coming six months.
At the same time, the potential for progress is enormous, but this progress would be gradual and may not become evident any time soon.
