In the
last several days, the relationship between the Colombian government
and the FARC has gone through a dramatic set of changes in tone.
Consistency must be regarded as a necessary stepping-stone in the
creation of an environment that allows for the success of dialogue,
as an essential part of the process to resolve the long-standing
armed conflict.
Just a
day after President Uribe publicly stated that the government was
unwilling to negotiate with terrorists, FARC suggested a possible
agreement to exchange the mortal remains of army major Julián
Guevara, who died while kidnapped, with the bodies of FARC leaders
Raúl Reyes and Iván Ríos, which the government
holds.
Adding to
the complexity of the changing dynamics, this latest back and forth
coincided with the revelations from the notebook of FARC leader, Mono
Jojoy. The records that were found in a camp, in which Jojoy seems to
have resided, convey in a very detailed manner, the way in which FARC
planned its attacks and handled its resources. The notebook has
records of forced abortions, plans for bombings, and drug and arms
trafficking.
The
ruthless, terrorist organization presented through Jojoy’s
notebook, would seemingly appear to be very different than the
organization that has taken the initiative to engage in a
humanitarian exchange with the government.
Even more
interestingly, with the FARC’s latest announcement comes a
clear departure from their non-negotiable demand that the government
would have to clear a significant area of the national territory if
the two sides were to engage in a humanitarian exchange. The FARC’s
willingness to let go from a demand that they had defended so sternly
shows the clearest shift of tone in their dealing with the government
since Uribe took office.
While the
perceived success of Uribe’s administration stems from most of
the military triumphs against FARC, and while that same military
pressure may very well be the reason that has led the guerrilla to
consider negotiations, Uribe must try to capitalize upon the
opportunities that have emerged alongside FARC’s rhetorical
shift.
During
this week’s back and forth the president mentioned that the
government should not negotiate with those outside the boundaries of
democratic society, particularly if they are terrorists.
While
Uribe’s concern is legitimate, the national reality is that
Colombia is plagued with groups that are outside those boundaries he
mentioned. If those groups — whether represented by top leaders like
Mono Jojoy, or by teenagers that have been pushed into the frontlines
of war — are already outside civil society, what is the way of
bringing them back into legality if not through negotiation?
The
challenge for FARC is not simple. They have, deservedly, a public
image defined by their willingness to kill, kidnap, displace, and
terrorize Colombian citizens. More so, as they express subtle signs
of a willingness to engage in dialogue, there are multiple actions
that seem to negate the existence of a true commitment to the
conflict’s resolution.
Colombia
has suffered the painstaking effects of a conflict that has torn the
very social fabric upon which the nation was built. If this shift in
tone is, in the slightest of ways, a sign of the FARC’s newly
found willingness to engage in negotiations, the government and the
civil society organizations must do everything in their power to
capitalize upon that opportunity. The obstacles for such a process
are far less significant than the consequences of continuing this
corroding conflict.
