Despite a 10% increase in FARC attacks in the first half of 2011, the security policy of the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos is not failing, according to a report that says guerrilla activity has been on the rise for three years.
Nuevo Arco Iris, an organization that studies Colombia’s conflict and politics, has gathered information about the ongoing struggle with the FARC in 2011 and compared it to data from the last two years of the conflict. The director of the NGO, Leon Valencia, analyzed the data and came to several conclusions regarding the changing dynamic of the warfare and has made some suggestions for continuing the fight.
| {japopup type=”image”content=”pics/2011/mphoto/cifras_farc1.jpg” title=”Graph 1″} |
First, Valencia argued that the apparent resurgence of the FARC is not due to a failure on the part of President Juan Manuel Santos. He compared the number of “actions” carried out by the FARC in the first half of 2011 to actions in the first halves of 2009 and 2010.
Although FARC activity has increased 10% from 2010, Valencia maintained that the increase has remained consistent for three years.
“We can say that the increase in the actions of the FARC, during the first half of 2011, has a similar trend as the previous two years during that same period. That is, the current situation cannot be attributed to the change of government, because since 2009 the FARC show a gradual increase in their armed actions and an increase in the lethality of the same.”
Valencia argued against recent comments from President Santos and the defense minister, which suggested that the recent FARC attacks are a sign of desperation and weakness. He believed the increase in FARC attacks is due to the change of strategy carried out by the supreme FARC leader, alias “Alfonso Cano.”
He suggested that “the actions of the FARC are characterized by punches, by mobility, and by avoiding prolonged clashes.” These quick, deliberate attacks are part of a new strategy where small groups of no more than five FARC members carry out attacks against military positions and strongholds, using snipers, anti-personnel landmines, and more general harassment.
The report also argued that although members of the Colombia’s armed forces are wearing down, they are not experiencing demoralization. According to Valencia, a factor that has caused the troops to wear down is the 2010 rhetoric of General Padilla de Leon, which came after the deaths of two FARC commanders. He suggested that the struggle was at the “end of the end” and that the FARC forces could be nearly eliminated in less than a year. These assertions never materialized, which lowered the confidence of the military.
According to the report, the war is occurring on three stages. The first is near the border of Venezuela in the department of Arauca, an important area for drug trafficking. There is a high volume of guerrilla activity, with both the FARC and ELN operating in the area. Valencia suggested that nearly 20,000 members of Colombia’s security forces are fighting in this area.
The second stage is taking place in central Colombia near the Cauca region. These attacks are widely publicized because the armed forces are supposedly closing in on Cano while the FARC ravage the region with a slew of new attacks every day, mostly on indigenous inhabitants.
The third and least publicized front is taking place along the southern border of Colombia, where there is an all-out war. “There, the intensity of conflict is quite high, though it has not become visible in the media,” said Valencia.
The report recommended that the best way for the government to move forward is “to purge the local institutions and national criminal networks that have permeated and corrupted. For all illegal armed groups and criminal structures, the first thing that they seek is the protection and information, hence the main objectives of these groups is to permeate the institutions.”
With several prominent politicians of President Alvaro Uribe’s administration being accused and convicted of ties to right-wing paramilitaries, the FARC supposedly gain some legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
Valencia concluded, “the debate over institutional cleaning should not be taken as an attack on the armed forces, on the other hand it is perhaps today the best strategy for increasing the country’s security.”