Colombia Reports

The recent announcement of a USD 4 billion spending on military equipment for the Colombian army illustrates the government’s war policies. The profitable Colombian military industry obtained, in 2006, the exclusive rights to manufacture the current generation of Israeli Galil assault rifles, producing 45,000 annually. Currently, the government is negotiating with Israel to manufacture the next generation of rifles. Moreover, just after the latest hostage release the government has insisted on military rescue for the remaining hostages, when is well-known the FARC would kill all hostages in case of rescue attempts. This was the case with a former governor and later eleven regional legislators, the latter were killed when the FARC mistook an approaching guerrilla group for the army.

The recently released former governor, Alan Jara, echoed the increasing public sentiment that the two main protagonist of Colombia’s conflict benefit from a perpetual state of war. On the one hand, The FARC, as one commander explicated to Jara, long a continuation of the current government war policies because greater war would lead to a “revolutionary situation”, as Lenin envisaged. For instance, the government’s the-means-justify-the-ends actions such as the ‘false positives’ are revitalizing the guerrillas struggle. This marginal support together with the FARC's economic resources would suffice to lure young and poor peasants to their ranks.

In contrast, the war dynamic enables the government to cling to power with a mandate to remove the guerrillas, while advancing economic policies that strengthen the elite. Despite some questionable government’s actions, there is a sizeable number of Colombians assessing Uribe’s government by the success against the FARC. It is true that the government has succeeded in decreasing the FARC manoeuvrability but this has reached an impasse, this is after all guerrilla warfare, a 40-year long guerrilla war. However, policies other than an all-out war are not in the political and economic interest of those elites supporting the current government.

Every time the FARC commences a hostage release the government becomes concern that the all-out war discourse would lose support and a peaceful approach would take hold. This is evident during the recent hostages release when Uribe dismissed left-wing senator Piedad Cordoba, who had helped broker the release, from taking part in Jara’s liberation – Cordoba was reinstated hours later. Uribe implied that the senator had been using this opportunity for gaining political limelight. This is not the first time Uribe has obstructed FARC’s release of hostages. Uribe actions are understandable since a left-wing presidential candidate received 22 per cent of the votes in the 2006 elections. There is no one using the current situation for political gains more than Uribe himself.

The government, instead of following Vegetius’ maxim that only aggravates the conflict, should turn to Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”. This Chinese ancient text formulates: “when you surround an army, let an outlet free”. This outlet, in terms of the Colombian realities, should start with a humanitarian agreement and continue with a realistic peace process where the social problems afflicting the country are addressed. Therefore, the FARC, at perceiving their futile war are likely to take advantage of this fair outlet, instead of keeping an unproductive stalemate. However, given the government’s intransigency and war interest, Colombians would be wise to support a radically different leader in 2010.

Author Sebastian Castaneda is Colombian studies psychology and political economy at the University of Hong Kong