Since 2000, Plan Colombia has sought to eliminate cocaine production
through massive aerial spraying of coca fields with weedkiller. Now, 9
years later, we have seen not only the environmental and social
destruction caused by this spraying, but also its failure to lower coca
production.
First, it should be acknowledged that the production of cocaine is very harmful to the
environment. Each acre of coca requires four acres of rainforest to be
cleared, and processing cocaine uses highly toxic chemicals such as
kerosene, sulfuric acid, acetone, and carbide, which are typically
dumped into rainforest streams.
However, in trying to eliminate coca production, aerial spraying has
actually made the problem worse. Not only does aerial spraying
indiscriminately kill native plants and farmers' food crops along with
coca, but farmers often replant coca deeper into the forest after their
first crop has been destroyed, causing further deforestation. In
addition, aerial spraying often causes the cocaine industry to simply
move to a different area, bringing violence and corruption with it.
Thus, in recent years drug production and political unrest has risen in
Bolivia and Peru due to displacement of coca production from Colombia.
Within Colombia, coca production has shifted from the Southeast to the
western Pacific coast, where farmers are planting smaller coca plots in
more isolated areas, making them much more difficult to find. The
increase in activity of rebel groups like FARC in this region has led
to the displacement and murder of local teachers and tribespeople. In
addition, increase!
d coca production and hunting poses a large threat to the environment,
especially given that the western Pacific coast of Colombia is an
internationally-recognized "biodiversity hotspot" – that is, it is one
of the most biologically rich and fragile regions in the world.
All of this harm, caused by displacement of the cocaine industry due to
spraying, might be justified if aerial spraying were effectively
eradicating coca production. However, the most recent U.N. data shows
that between 2006 and 2007 coca production in Colombia increased by
27%, reaching its highest level since 2001 (U.N., 2008). In reality,
Plan Colombia has not even come close to achieving its initial goal of
halving coca production in six years, and it is never going to succeed
so long as there is such high demand for cocaine in U.S. and Europe.
Although it is certainly true that the U.S. and European demand for
cocaine is the primary cause of the problem, it is overly optimistic
for Colombia to expect the U.S. government to substantially reduce
demand. The United States has been waging a "War on Drugs" since 1969,
it currently has the highest incarceration rate worldwide, and it has
invested $5 billion in Plan Colombia precisely because it has had so
much trouble controlling drugs and gangs at home.
Instead, Colombia needs to shift its strategy by making alternative
rural development the centerpiece of its war on drugs. Alternative
development – in the form of credit, infrastructure, cattle, forestry,
fish, medicines, etc. – has always been a part of Plan Colombia, but is
has taken a backseat to more military efforts like crop-spraying.
Alternative development, however, can be a powerful incentive for
farmers to voluntarily move away from coca.
The success stories of NGOs like Desarrollo y Paz have shown that even in the most conflict-ridden areas, farmers recognize the high social cost of coca, and they are willing to follow alternative livelihoods so long as they offer a reasonable standard of living (Economist 2001).
Finally, the United States has begun to realize that aerial spraying is not that effective. In January 2008, the U.S. Congress decreased military spending in their aid for Plan Colombia from 82 percent to 65 percent, and increased economic aid from 8 percent to 35 percent (Graham, 2008). Perhaps if Colombia takes the lead in championing rural economic development over military eradication, then the United States will follow suite and shift its aid in that direction as well.
Author Ben Gutierrez is a U.S. biology student at Harvard University.
References:
"Spraying Misery." The Economist. 19 April 2001: 7-9. Accessed 14 April 2009.Graham-Silverman, Adam. "Colombian Aid Gets New Cash Calculus." CQ Weekly Online. Jan 28 2008: 239-239. Accessed 14 April 2009.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "2008 World Drug Report." p 66. Accessed 14 April 2008.
MindytheWatchDog
said:
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... You are incorrectly quoting statistics in this article. There is a very big difference between cocaine production and coca cultivation. You have confused the two. You have only focused on UN figures for coca cultivation, which have no bearing on potential cocaine production. The UN report also notes that coca cultivation is significantly reduced from the 1990s, but I guess your forgot to cite that line of the introduction of the UN report. In fact, you also neglected to mention that the UN report shows that cocaine production is actually DOWN in Colombia due to reduced coca yields. You then neglected to mention anything about the U.S. surveys, which report potential cocaine production is down 24% in Colombia due to aerial spraying, as sprayed plants or newly replanted plants are much less productive. All of these numbers and reports are useless when used like this - you must paint the full picture, not partial numbers to push a political agenda through the media. |
gringo michae
said:
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... I agree with the writer spraying is not a sound pratice, Iwould be interested in see the number of how much of the money sent is actully used to fight growing coca, I think we would find it a small percentage, Plan Colombia while sold as a plan to fight drugs is really nothing more then a backdoor attempt to help a friend in the region to stablize the country to fight back the FARC and Paramilitary along with drug cartels. |
BenG
said:
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... I am sorry if I gave the impression that aerial spraying has done nothing to reduce coca production, that is not what I believe. Aerial spraying HAS reduced coca production since 2000. However, progress has slowed to a standstill in recent years, and the government has not even reached its 50% goal after 9 years. You are absolutely right that I confused coca cultivation with coca production. However, the introduction of the UN report says that coca cultivation in 2007 was down from its PEAK in the 1990s - that is, below 1999 (which is the highest year ever along with 2000), but greater than or equal to every year before that (p 66). Also, according to the U.N. report, Colombian coca production remained constant from 2006 to 2007, and cocaine production in 2007 was only 14% less than its highest peak in 2000, and it was actually higher than in 2002 and 2003 (p 66). |
BenG
said:
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... To Gringo Michae, You are probably right that the main purpose of Plan Colombia is to help Colombia's government in the struggle against the guerilla groups and drug cartels. I guess I should have titled the editorial something more along the lines of, "alternative development would be more effective at eradicating coca than aerial spraying" |
wyzguy
said:
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... I like the information presented in this article as a novice in the efforts that surround Plan Colombia and the effect they have had on the region since its inception. I will have to say given the facts that have been presented both in the article and the discussion thereafter that less is more in the way of spraying at this point in the struggle to reduce the cultivation of coca. I think a good mix of policy is best with rural development and carefully planned military tactics in attempt to reduce the cultivation. I believe that all too often in the 'War on Drugs' the idea of social development and education has been lost or at minimum sidetracked by agressive short term results usually associated with Military tactics. I think this is at heart the intent of the article and is a point well taken. |
